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1 The aim of this book is to provide a new account of the fundamental 
concepts and arguments that defi ne Heidegger’s early work; specifi c-
ally, my focus will be on the period from 1919 to 1935. I am interested 
in three sets of issues in particular, and in the interaction between 
them. The fi rst concerns the interpretation and validity of the various 
philosophical theses which Heidegger advances. How, for example, 
should we understand his theory of intentionality? In what sense, if 
any, does he regard linguistic or propositional meaning as a secondary 
phenomenon or even a distorting one? What exactly is Heideggerian 
“understanding” or “anxiety” and what, if anything, do these ideas 
imply for current debates over conceptualism or ‘know how’ or nor-
mativity? How do his views on these and other topics relate to those of 
other phenomenologists, or to contemporary analytic research? The 
second set of issues concerns the complex links between Heidegger’s 
own thought and his extensive and vastly detailed commentaries 
on the philosophical canon. Why, for example, does he place such 
emphasis on Kant’s Schematism? How does the role of society in texts 
such as  SZ mirror or diverge from its role in Heidegger’s predecessors 
such as Hegel? Why are Heidegger’s remarks on Plato, whether pages 
or years apart, so often deeply confl icted, hedged, alternately hesitant 
and overplayed? I will place particular stress on Kant, an author whom 
Heidegger knew in huge detail and to whom he devoted more than 
a thousand pages of intricate commentary: examining the tripartite 
relationship between Heidegger himself, his reading of Kant and an 
orthodox view of the Critical system will prove an important exeget-
ical tool, one which throws into relief many of the unspoken assump-
tions that underpin Heidegger’s own thought. The third set of issues 
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concerns Heidegger’s distinctive conceptual apparatus and its connec-
tion to the development of his philosophy. What  exactly does he mean 
by “being” and what are the implications of that answer for doctrines 
such as the ontological difference? What is the distinction between 
discoveredness [ Entdecktheit ] and disclosedness [ Erschlossenheit ], or 
between the different senses of temporality marked by “ Zeitlichkeit ” 
and “ Temporalit ä t ”? What work is being done by those distinctions? 
Could they be articulated in another philosophical vocabulary – if 
not, why not? Similarly, what does he mean by “freedom” and how does 
he ultimately come to see it as “prior even to being and time”? 1 
 My plan is to look in detail both at the core questions within each of 
these three sets of issues and at the interaction between them. I argue 
that the picture of Heidegger which emerges is radically different 
from that currently dominant, especially within the Anglo-American 
literature. To take a single case, I deny that Dasein’s primary level of 
experience is nonconceptual: I defend this view against the widespread 
treatment of Heidegger as a pioneering nonconceptualist. I also argue, 
however, that the picture of Heidegger which emerges from my read-
ing captures what is distinctive in his thought, what sets his theory 
apart from any other philosophical position. To stick with the same 
case, for example, I contend that whilst Dasein’s primary intention-
ality is conceptual, it is  nevertheless nonpropositional. I thus present 
Heidegger as attempting to mark out a distinctive logical space, one 
missed by both conceptualists and nonconceptualists in so far as they 
equate the conceptual and the propositional. Further, I show how his 
attempt to defend this move is closely tied to the unfi nished, and I sug-
gest unfi nishable, project of  SZ , and I chronicle his attempts to shore 
up that project in the years after 1927. 
 The structure of the book is as follows. I begin in  Chapter 1 
with Heidegger’s theory of intentionality. I argue that this is best 
approached via two claims: that propositional intentionality is in 
some sense explanatorily derivative, and that propositional inten-
tionality is in some sense linked to a particular ontology, that of the 
“present-at-hand”. I canvas ten existing accounts of these two claims 
as defended by Dreyfus, Carman, Wrathall and others. I argue that 
despite their sophistication no existing account meets the twin cri-
teria of exegetical and philosophical plausibility. In  Chapter 2 , I 
therefore offer a new interpretation of the supposed link between 
 1  Ga31: 134. 
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the propositional and the present-at-hand as sketched in texts such 
as  SZ §33. Locating Heidegger in relation to Russell and Frege, I 
claim that his point does not concern propositional intentionality 
itself, but rather only a subset of propositions, those that have been 
subjected to a particular meta-linguistic analysis. I contrast my view 
with those of Blattner, Dahlstrom, Carman, Wrathall and others 
and argue for its advantages. In  Chapter 3 , I turn to the other claim 
through which I approached Heideggerian intentionality, the claim 
that propositional content is in some sense explanatorily derivative. 
This chapter is the longest in the book, and it is the most complex. 
The key to Heidegger’s position, I suggest, lies with his idea of under-
standing ‘something as something’, or, as he puts it, understanding 
‘ a as  b ’. To grasp his argument one needs to look closely at each com-
ponent here: the ‘as’ and the  a and  b variables. After discussing the 
‘as’ in relation to Heidegger’s work on meaning and on the idea of 
a context, I address the  a variable: I distinguish several distinct rep-
resentationalist theories of intentionality and I contrast Heidegger’s 
position with those, with the West and East Coast readings of Husserl 
and with contemporary analytic disjunctivism and relationalism. My 
main focus, however, is on the  b variable, which I argue plays a foun-
dational role in Heidegger’s system, determining his understanding 
of concepts such as meaning, the ontological difference and the a 
priori. I support these claims by looking closely at Heidegger’s work 
on Kant and on Plato: in both cases, I provide a new interpretation of 
the relevant texts. My conclusion is a novel one: propositional inten-
tionality is derivative for Heidegger on a mode of experience with 
a unique  grammar , a mode of experience that is conceptual and yet 
nonpropositional. I show, further, how his thinking on this issue is 
decisively infl uenced by, and indeed constitutes a “repetition of”, in 
 SZ ’s distinctive sense of that phrase, Kant’s Schematism and Plato’s 
doctrine of ideas. 
 In  Chapter 4 , I shift from intentionality to metaphysics in the broad-
est sense. I contend that Heidegger’s work on truth and his defi nition 
of “being” both mesh with my approach. I also argue for a realist 
interpretation of his work and contrast my views on this with those of 
Blattner, Carman and Lafont. But the results of this chapter do not, I 
warn, change the fact that the underlying position which Heidegger 
defends, the position set out in  Chapter 3 , faces signifi cant philosoph-
ical problems. I propose, in  Chapter 5 , that we thus see a develop-
ment in Heidegger’s thinking as he attempts to work through these 
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problems in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 2 This shift culminates in an 
increased emphasis on freedom: I argue that this emphasis is designed 
to articulate the central role of normativity within Heidegger’s system 
and I show how this both fl eshes out and extends strands present in 
 SZ . I support my claims here by looking closely at Heidegger’s work on 
Kant’s philosophy of action: I stress the importance for both philoso-
phers of the link between normativity and the fi rst-person perspective. 
I close in  Chapter 6 , by showing how those questions of freedom, of 
the fi rst person and of “mineness” link to authenticity. I contend that 
for Heidegger authentic agents possess a distinctive awareness of the 
limitations of normative space, of the “space of reasons” to use the 
Sellarsian metaphor. Heidegger refers to those limitations as Dasein’s 
“fi nitude” and unpacks them through discussion of existential concepts 
such as death and guilt. I explain and critically assess the way in which 
Heidegger connects those discussions to issues such as perfectionism, 
 phronesis and ‘the one’: I contrast Heidegger’s position with Hegel’s, 
and my account with those advanced by contemporary commentators 
such as Crowell and Carman. I end by indicating how the various lines 
of argument I have sketched might be brought together to overcome 
the problems which ultimately undermine texts such as  SZ . 
 Heidegger’s philosophy, as I see it, is an innovative and highly 
unusual one. My goal in this book is to try to set out and assess some 
of the distinctive inferences, assumptions, infl uences and errors that 
drive it. 
 
 2  I regard claims about this shift as independent from more familiar debates about the 
 Kehre as it is usually understood; for example, I make little appeal to texts such as Ga65. 
Generally, the time frame on which I focus means that I take no particular view on 
either the existence or nature of a ‘later Heidegger’, although I fi nd any suggestion of 
a binary change extremely implausible. Where my arguments support or clash with 
some specifi c thesis regarding texts or terms after 1935 I will note this (see especially 
p. 254). 
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